Research overview:
My research examines how intellectual property, information asymmetries, and legal institutions shape firms’ innovation and disclosure decisions. I combine applied microeconometrics, simple theory, and original datasets to generate evidence that is useful for innovation and competition policy.
A first line of work studies strategic behaviour under IP and information asymmetry, with a focus on how firms use contractual and disclosure choices to manage knowledge flows. My job market paper links an incomplete-contracting view of trade-secret protection to global automotive supply networks, showing how weaker secrecy environments induce OEMs to rely more on exclusive supplier relationships. Related work analyses disclosure around pending patents and the market consequences of these choices. A second, closely related line examines the design of policy for innovation incentives. Here, my sole-authored work quantifies firms’ willingness to pay to avoid legal uncertainty in Europe’s Unified Patent Court, using firms’ patenting choices to infer the private costs of institutional change.
A third line of work develops empirical tools and data for innovation research. This includes a 2025 article in Economic Inquiry on patent-based innovation measures for heterogeneous country samples and ongoing work on open data assets such as indicators for "prophetic patents". A fourth line studies knowledge diffusion and university-industry links using survey evidence. In this stream, a paper (2nd round R&R) tests how informing firms about engagement channels affects their reporting of university knowledge sourcing.